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REGULATION AND TAXATION OF THE VARIABLE ANNUITY

Introduction
The variable annuity, a hybrid retirement planning device which
combines many of the features of life insurance and equity investment,. has been proposed by a sizable segment of the life insurance
industry as the answer to that industry's problem in maintaining its
share of the nation's retirement-planning dollar. The proposal has
erupted into a controversy which has split the otherwise staid industry into two even camps, pro and con, as to whether the insurance
industry should market the variable annuity. Virtually all of the
nation's major mutual funds, investment bankers and stock brokers
have joined in condemning the plan, which poses one of their greatest
potential sources of competition to appear in years.
This note is intended to present a basic outline of the purpose
and nature of the variable annuity and of some of the many problems
to which it gives rise. The areas of regulation and taxation, which
should be of especial interest to the legal profession, will be treated
in detail.

Purpose of the Variable Annuity
The basic objective of the typical American's retirement planning is to amass a capital fund before retirement that will suffice to
provide him with enough funds, over and above receipts from social
security and pension plans, to maintain a predetermined standard of
living for the remainder of his life. He may seek to attain this objective during his productive lifetime by means of personal savings,
personally managed investments or a commercially managed investment fund. However, the principal disadvantage of these methods
is that the retired individual may outlive his accumulated capital,
either because of the necessity of earlier and increased withdrawals
of capital because of its decreased buying power or, even more probably, because he simply lived longer than he had planned upon.
Traditionally, the life insurance industry has supplied the solution to the problem of outliving retirement capital through the sale
of its conventional annuity. This contract, however, has fallen prey
to inflation. During the last decade the inflexible periodic payments,
probably planned and established twenty to thirty years ago, have
proved inadequate in practically all instances to maintain the individual's desired standard of living and in some cases even to meet
the basic needs of the annuitant, because of the declining purchasing
power of the dollar.' The solution to this problem, according to
proponents of the variable annuity, is a retirement program which
2 See Schechter, Variable Annuities-Boon or Bane?, 1956 INs. L.J. 764,
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supplements the conventional annuity contract with variable annuities.
Ideally, the variable annuity would provide the annuitant with periodic payments, the dollar amount of which would fluctuate in close
relation to the fluctuations in the dollar's purchasing power. The
conventional annuity would continue to provide a guaranteed fixed
dollar-income. It is hoped that the combined income of the two plans
will provide a fairly constant amount of purchasing power which in
turn would enable the annuitant to maintain the dsired standard of
living, during good times or bad, for the remainder of his life.
Description of the Plan
The variable annuity is probably best explained by comparing it
with the conventional annuity. Under the terms of the present or
conventional annuity, the annuitant either makes a single lump-sum
payment or contracts to make a series of fixed-premium payments to
the insurer during his income-producing years. In return, the insurer
guarantees to pay the annuitant, beginning at a stated future date,
a fixed number of dollars at set periodic intervals for the remainder
of his life.
The variable annuitant also contracts to make a fixed series of
premium payments over the span of his productive years, but here
the similarity ends. Most of the premium payment is invested in
common stock. Each premium payment, after the deduction of a
specified amount for loading charges, is credited to the annuitant's
account in the form of "accumulation units." The number of
''accumulation units" to be credited is determined by dividing the
net amount of the premium payment by the current value of an
"caccumulation unit." The basic value of an "accumulation unit" is
arbitrarily established at the initiation of the program. At stated
periods thereafter, usually monthly, the basic unit value is adjusted
dependent upon the current investment experience of the common
stock portfolio, including income and both realized and unrealized
capital gains and losses. The unit value is not affected by the mortality experience or current operating expenses of the program. These
factors are assumed by the insurer, who is compensated by the loading charge.2
A simplified numerical example may best illustrate these computations.
A. Assume that the variable annuity fund is established in December, 1958,
with initial premium payments, after deduction of the loading charge,
of $10,000 and that such payments are then invested. Assume further
that the value of an "accumulation unit" is fixed at $100. As of December 31 each annuitant will be credited with one "accumulation unit"
or part thereof for every $100 or fraction thereof that he has paid in
premiums.
B. Assume that the market value of the initial $10,000 fund has increased
lo $10,200 at the end of the first monthly period. As a result each
"accumulation unit" will now be worth $102 and a like premium payment will be required to purchase a unit during the month of January.
2
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The insurer makes no commitment to pay a fixed dollar-amount
to the annuitant during the payout period. Rather, each periodic
payment obligation will be determined by the number of "annuity
units" in the annuitant's account multiplied by the current value of
an "annuity unit." At the beginning of the retirement period the
"accumulation units" which have been credited to the annuitant's
account are converted into "annuity units." This calculation, which
is basically the same as is used in the conventional annuity payment
tables, would be based on the current value of the "accumulation
units," the expected average return of the portfolio, and the annuitant's life expectancy as determined by the standard mortality tables.
The number of "annuity units," once determined, would remain the
same for the entire payout period. Each periodic payment, however,
would be dependent on the current value of an "annuity unit," such
value being calculated in the same manner as the value of an
"accumulation unit." 3
Thus, the essential difference is that under the conventional contract the insurer's obligation is fixed and stated as an exact number
of dollars, whereas under the variable annuity contract the insurer's
obligation is expressed in terms of a number of units, each payment
varying in accordance with the current performance of a common
stock portfolio.
The proponents of the variable annuity, armed with an array of
studies on past long-term trends in stock prices, living costs and dollar purchasing value, claim that over the years the yield from common
stock investments has more closely reflected the changes in the dollar's
purchasing power than any other form of investment.4 Seeing no
reason for this performance to change, they feel that a variable payment plan centered about a common stock portfolio will solve the
annuitant's inflation problems. Theoretically, at least, as consumer
prices rise the value of the portfolio will increase by a relatively simiFor a detailed explanation and illustration of the computations involved, see
Day, A Variable Annuity Is Not A "Security," 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 642,
647-50 (1957).
3 Another simplified example may serve to illustrate these principles.
Assume that the annuitant has 1,000 "accumulation units," the current value of
which is $120,000, in his account at the time of conversion. Further assume
that the standard net annuity factor for a person his age is 9.6 per month per
thousand dollar investment, and that the current value of an "annuity unit"
is $125. Basically, the dollar amount that would be received monthly under
a conventional annuity is first determined. The monthly payment would be
120 (thousands of dollars in current value) multiplied by 9.6 or $1,152. The
number of "annuity units" is then determined by dividing the monthly payments under a standard annuity by the current value of an "annuity unit."
Thus $1,152 will be divided by $125 and is found to be 9.216. Each monthly
payment thereafter will be determined by multiplying 9.216 by the current
value of an annuity unit. For a detailed explanation and complete illustration
of the computations involved, see Day, suapra note 2, at 650-53.
4 See Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed.
1956 INs. L.J. 357, 358-61.
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lar amount. As a result, the periodic payments to the annuitant would
also increase in dollar amount, thus protecting his purchasing power
during an inflationary period. Stress is placed on what the dollar will
buy rather than on the number of dollars received. In theory, the
annuitant would also be protected from the common hazards of equity
investment. The annuitant will be paying premiums over a long
period of time and will probably receive his annuity payments over
another substantially long period. Therefore, the portfolio would be
in a position of long-term buying and selling at varying prices rather
than at any one market level. Likewise, under the theory of dollarcost averaging, which comes into play whenever an equal number of
dollars are invested at regular intervals in a particular commodity at
fluctuating prices, the average cost per share in the fund should be
lower than the average price over the buying periodY This belowaverage cost would be reflected by an increase in the annuitant's number of "accumulation units." The main difficulty in this area is that
premium payments must be regular. Inability or unwillingness to
make the premium payment when the price of common stock is low,
which is very likely since the annuitant's income might also be depressed, would negate and might even reverse the dollar-cost averaging aspects of the program.
The natural objection to the variable annuity is that the variable
annuitant would receive little, if any, income should there be a depression or serious fall in the price of common stocks. While it is
true that the cost of living would also drop during such a period, past
experience has shown that the value of common stocks drops much
faster and deeper than does the cost of living. 6 It is conceivable that
the value of an "annuity unit" would be practically nothing during a
depression period. The annuitant, however, would still have to expend a minimum amount of money for the bare essentials of life.
This is why the proponents of the variable annuity urge it only as a
supplement to, rather than as a substitute for, the conventional annuity program. The Prudential Life Insurance Company, a leading
proponent, has announced that in order to provide its policy holders
with a retirement plan which will protect them in good times and in
bad it will require, as an underwriting policy, that the annuitant
allocate approximately fifty per cent of his total premium payments to
conventional annuity policies. 7 In times of high prices the variable
policy would provide high purchasing power, while this would be pro5See Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Jan.-Feb. 1957, pp. 75, 78-79.
6 Address by Frederic W. Ecker, President of the Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., at the Texas Life Convention, October 19, 1956.

7 See Melnikoff, Thinking Clearly About Variable Annuities, 61 Lnrz INS.
COURANT 32, 34 (1956). An examination of the policies and sales literature
of the three companies presently issuing variable annuities reveals that none of
these companies impose balance requirements in the terms of their policies or
as a matter of underwriting policy.
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vided in times of low prices by the fixed guaranteed return of the
conventional annuity. It is felt, therefore, that by complementing one
plan with the other, the annuitant will fare better in terms of actual
buying power than a person restricting his retirement planning to
one particular vehicle. By such balancing it is contended that a certain standard of living, which presumably is the end the retired individual is desirous of attaining, will be assured for life.
Regulation-Federal or State9
When the variable annuity was first proposed there were many
academic discussions as to the nature of the controls which might be
placed upon their sale. The issues were joined late in 1955 when
the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, 8 under license from
the Insurance Commissioner of the District of Columbia, made the
first public offering of a variable policy. The Securities and Exchange
Commission,9 after a hearing held at the urging of the National Association of Securities Dealers,10 issued a pronouncement that the variable annuity is a security and subject to the registration requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933.11 It also ruled that VALIC, as issuer
of the security, is subject to the provisons of the Investment Company
Act of 1940.12 VALIC refused to abide by the determination and
continued issuing the contracts without compliance, contending that
the variable annuity is an insurance contract and that VALIC is an
insurance company and therefore exempt under the terms of the statutes themselves and under the terms of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 3
Shortly thereafter, the SEC and NASD (who joined in the action as a plaintiff intervenor) set the current legal controversy in
motion by seeking an injunction restraining VALIC from selling or
S Hereinafter referred to as VALIC.

9 Hereinafter referred to as SEC.
Hereinafter referred to as NASD.
The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security as: "Any note, . . . certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, . . . investment contract, . . . or, in general, any instrument commonly known as a
security." 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77b(I) (1952).
12The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines an investment company
to be a company which "is engaged . . . in the business of investing, reinvest"
54 STAT. 789, 797 (1940),
ing, owning, holding or trading in securities ...
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (3) (1952).
13 The Securities Act of 1933 specifically exempts from its provisions
"any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract . . . issued by a
corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner . . . or
any agency or officer performing like functions, of any state. . . ." 48 STAT.
76 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (a) (8) (1952). The Investment Company Act
of 1940 specifically exempts from its provisions a ". . . company which is
organized as an insurance company, whose primary.. . activity is the writing
of insurance. . . ." 54 STAT. 798 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(a)(3) (1952).
The McCarran Act exempts "the business of insurance" from federal regulation. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952).
1o
1I
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offering for sale its contracts until they were registered and until the
firm had complied with the Investment Company Act.14 The proceeding was based on the premise that the proper interpretation of
the relevant statutes was the only question involved. VALIC, stressing the guaranteed mortality and many other insurance features of
the contract, contended that the contract is one of insurance and
therefore exempt from regulation under the Securities Act. The SEC,
pointing to the fact that the units credited to the annuitant are in
effect an interest in the company's common stock portfolio and in the
gains and losses therefrom, urged that the contract was a security
and subject to federal regulation under the Securities Act.
It is most likely that neither side is entirely correct, and that in
reality the problem is legislative rather than judicial. Neither the
contract in question nor any contract resembling it was in existence
or contemplated at the time the statutes were enacted. 1 As can be
readily seen from the pleadings of both sides, the contract is a hybrid
which combines many of the features of both insurance and a
security.'
The contract as a unit is truly novel and will not fit
exactly within the terms of any of the statutes involved.
The SEC decided to attempt to impose the federal securities
regulations upon the sale of the variable annuity through the judicial7
process. In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America,
the district court held that since VALIC was chartered as a life insurance company, and since it had denominated the contract an annuity, the federal government was precluded from exercising regulatory control over the sale of such contracts under the terms of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. The court of appeals affirmed, on the basis
that if the insurance commissioner of a state considers the variable
annuity business as coming under his supervision, it is the business of
insurance and exempt from federal regulation.' 8 The decision may
have accomplished a desirable result. By refusing to issue the restraining order the courts have indirectly referred the problem to the
legislature, a more appropriate forum for its solution. As a result of
this decision the states which do permit or intend to permit the issuance of the variable annuity have been given time to investigate, draft
and possibly enact new and comprehensive regulatory statutes specifically applicable to variable annuities. If the states take advantage
of this opportunity it will then be squarely up to Congress whether
to continue to abstain or to enter the field by enacting new regulatory
legislation.
STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a (1952).
125The first variable annuity contracts were issued by the College Retire1454

ment Equities Fund in 1952.

See Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable

Annuity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1957, pp. 75, 78-9.

16 See Day, A Variable Annuity Is an Annuity, 1955 INs. L.J. 775.

155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1957).
Is SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 257 F.2d 201 (D.C.
Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 27 U.S.L. WEEx 3111 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1958) (No. 237).
17
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It is probable that the federal government has the power to subject the variable annuity to its regulation, whether it be a security
or insurance.' 9 It would appear therefore that the proper question
is not which sovereignty can regulate the sale of these contracts but
rather which body or bodies should regulate their sale. Exclusive
regulation of these contracts under either the present securities laws
or the present insurance laws would be inadequate. Most state insurance statutes were designed basically to preserve the solvency of
the insurance companies in order to guarantee the fulfillment of their
obligations.2 0 The federal securities statutes have as their main purpose the protection of investors against imposition and fraud in selling
tactics.2 1 However, because of the hybrid nature of the variable annuity, a combination of the features of both these types of protection
will be required in order to protect the consumer public adequately.
The main argument put forth for federal control is uniformity of
regulation. In this way, it is argued, all variable annuitants will be
afforded the same and supposedly complete protection. The NASD
also points to its 1957 survey of the state insurance commissioners,
which indicates that the commissioners are about evenly split on
the question whether to permit the sale of variable annuities as
insurance.2 2 Therefore, the Association contends that confusion
would prevail under state control and the sale of some of the
policies will eventually fall under the SEC anyway.23 But it is
conceivable that many of the insurance commissioners were being
overly cautious or overly strict in construing their present state
statutes. Amendment of these statutes can certainly cure this defect.
Primary among the arguments in favor of state control is the
avoidance of dual federal-state control over the insurance companies
issuing both" conventional life lines and the variable annuity. Such
dual regulation would undoubtedly lead to many administrative difficulties and duplication of effort where federal and state regulations
conflict.24

The policy set forth in the McCarran-Ferguson Act must

also be considered. The act clearly expresses the congressional belief
that it is in the best interests of the nation that the federal government abstain from enacting statutes regulating the insurance industry
and that such regulation should continue to be a state function
19 United

States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
See Funston, The Case Against Variable Annuities, Dun's Review &
Modern Industry, Oct. 1956, pp. 41, 42. However, some states have recognized
the need for protection against misrepresentation and have added such protection to their insurance statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 127.
21 See Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1939).
22 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
4711.
23 It is generally conceded that if the insurance commissioners classify the
contract as not being insurance, the courts would hold it to be a security and
subject it to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
24 For a discussion of some of the areas in which a conflict might arise
see Day, A Variable Annuity Is an Annuity, 1955 INs. L.J. 775, 784-85.
20
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exclusively. 25 If the federal government enacts regulations affecting
the variable annuity, it would certainly violate the spirit, if not the
letter, of the act, assuming that the variable annuity is insurance.
Regulation of the Sale of Variable Annuities
No matter which jurisdiction eventually obtains control over the
regulation of the issuance and sale of variable annuities, there are
several important interests of the individual purchaser and of the
public which should be protected. The enactment of comprehensive
new statutes specifically relating to the variable annuities would be
the ideal solution; supplementation of present insurance or securities
codes the minimum.
Since the variable annuity salesman must possess a full understanding of the contract and be capable of conveying this understanding to the prospective purchaser, the regulations should require that
all salesmen be licensed. Eligibility for the license should be grounded
upon the passing of a special examination on the theory and explanation of the variable annuities. The statute should also provide for
prior approval of all sales literature. In this way the regulatory
agency could prevent the distribution of deceptive literature to the
sales force or to the prospective purchaser. So also could the danger
of misleading projections based on probable past performance be
greatly averted, since the agency could judge whether it was made
reasonably clear to the reader that such projections are hypothetical
only and not predicted or guaranteed in the future.26 Contract forms
and applications should similarly be subject to prior approval, predicated upon the normal standards of fairness plus the inclusion of a
clear statement of the essential features of the contract on the first
page. An indication of the unguaranteed and variable nature of the
contract should be required to appear in bold type at the head of the
policy. If properly enforced and supplemented by the regulatory
agency these prerequisites should preclude any public misunderstanding as to the nature of the contract.
Certain standards regulating the permissible investments of the
fund should be established in order to protect the contract holder from
extremely speculative investments. The National Association of
25The McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, which was passed
shortly after the decision in the South-Eastern Underwriters case, provides:
"Congress... declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
states of the business of insurance is in the public interest. . . ." 59 STAT. 33
(1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1952).
26 One of the strongest arguments against those favoring the plan is that
the public might be misguided as to the true nature of the contract. Most
variable annuity sales literature issued up to this time contains charts illustrating the yield in past years of annuity holders and the yield that they
theoretically would have received from a variable annuity under specified
conditions.
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Insurance Commissioners has recommended that such regulations include provisions, among others, limiting investment in the shares of
any one corporation to three per cent of its total outstanding shares;
prohibiting the purchase of shares not registered on a national securities exchange; prohibiting the purchase of shares in a corporation
not meeting earning and dividend requirements; and prohibiting conflicts of interest between officers and directors of the insurer and the
corporation whose stock is purchased.2 7
The issuers of such contracts should also be subject to the usual
procedural provisions imposed upon insurance companies, such as
annual examination, standardized reporting, service of process and
limitation of expenses. In order to keep the annuitant informed, an
annual report on the operations of the firm, in a form approved by
the regulatory body, should be provided each annuitant. A statement
of the annuitant's accumulation of units and their present value should
also be provided at least annually.
A majority of the subcommittee of the NAIC has also suggested
that the sale of the variable annuity be restricted to companies chartered for the sole purpose of issuing variable annuities. 28 It is contended by some that the use of separate corporate entities will serve
to further reduce any possibility of public misunderstanding and protect the industry's reputation if the annuities give rise to unfavorable
experiences. It seems improbable that the desired anonymity of the
parent corporation can be attained in view of the fact that the sales
force of the subsidiary would probably be quick to disclose the subsidiary's relation to the parent company. In addition, many other
additional administrative and tax costs would be imposed if two separate entities are required. Since such expenses will eventually be
passed on to the annuitant and no substantial benefits will apparently
result, it would seem impractical and uneconomical to require two
separate entities. The insurer guarantees only the mortality experience and administrative costs, as it does with its other lines. There
are no guaranteed returns to endanger the investment of the other
policy holders. Therefore, it would seem that a segregated variable
annuity fund, within the company, with no preference to variable
annuitants in a liquidation, would be as safe and a more practical and
economical means of operation than the subsidiary theory. The NAIC
has also proposed that regulatory statutes include a provision which
would establish balance requirements that must be maintained
throughout the life of the policy. 29 However, the state has fulfilled
its obligation when it requires that the purchaser be fully and fairly
advised of the nature and possible pitfalls of the plan. It is not the
function of the state or of the law to prevent competent adult citizens
27

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF INSURANCE COMMISSiONERs,

coMMITEE ON VARIABLE ANNUIES
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.

(1955).
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from spending their money in a foolish manner, if, indeed, the variable
annuity could be considered a foolish investment. In addition, it is
clear that it would be almost impossible to enforce or administer such
a requirement. Aside from these considerations, it is almost certain
that the insurers will voluntarily impose balance requirements as a
matter of underwriting policy in order to ward off any possibility of
mass cancellations during a depression period, as well as the consequent financial and good-will loss. 30
The above recommended regulations, together with the existing
general statutes and the common law, would seem to provide an adequate basis of protection for the variable annuity purchaser, the other
policy holders of the issuing company and the public as a whole. If
unforeseen problems arise, corrective legislation can be enacted as
necessary.
Present Status of the Variable Annuity
There are presently three new corporations specifically chartered
to issue variable annuities to the general public.31 Two are organized
and authorized to issue policies in the District of Columbia, one in
Arkansas. In addition the insurance commissioners of West Virginia
and Kentucky have approved the3 2 policies and authorized the sale of
variable annuities in their states.
Many other states, however, place restrictions on the total investment any insurer may make in common stocks. 33 In such states
it will be necessary to enact new legislation permitting the purchase
of large quantities of equity securities for the variable annuity program before such policies may be offered. Legislation may also be
necessary if the variable annuity funds are to be segregated from an
all-lines insurance company's general funds. Enabling legislation has
been introduced in the states of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and
Texas; however,
34
none of these have been enacted as of this date.
In New York, the home of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, one of the plan's strongest opponents, a bill permitting
VALIC to sell individual variable annuity contracts was passed by
both houses in 1954. However, it was vetoed by the governor after
strong opposition from the State Commissioner of Insurance. 35 Simi30

See Note, The Classification.And Regulation Of Variable Annuities, 42

MINN. L. REv.
31 Morrissey,

1115, 1134-36 (1958).

Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb.
1957, pp. 75, 77 n.2.
32 See Brief for Appellee, p. 3, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of
America, 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
3 See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw § 81(13) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 506.1(g) (2)
(Purdon 1954).
34 Schecbter, Variable Annuities-Boon or Bane?, 1956 INs. L.J. 764, 767.
35 Ibid. Passage of enabling legislation in New York would appear to be a
prerequisite to the issuance of the variable annuity by any of the major insur-
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lar bills have been introduced over the past four years, but all have
died in committee. It is interesting to note that the variable annuity
had its birth in New York State. In 1952, the College Retirement
Equities Fund 36 was established by a special act of the New York
legislature 7 as an adjunct to the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association.38 Under this plan all members of TIAA are entitled to
allocate up to fifty per cent of their total premium payments towards
a type of policy which was the inspiration of today's variable annuity.
Mr. George E. Johnson, Vice President and General Counsel of
CREF, became convinced that such policies should be offered to the
general public. He resigned from CREF and was elected president
of VALIC upon its organization. Resigning from that position in
1956, he assumed his present position as President of Equity Annuity
Life Insurance Company. Thus it is not surprising that the present
day policies bear a resemblance to the early policies of CREF.
There is a great amount of controversy among the nation's insurance companies as to whether they should write a policy of this
nature. The proponents of the policy, led by the Prudential Life
Insurance Company, envision the sale of the variable annuity as the
fulfillment of the industry's responsibility to the public to provide it
with an adequate means of preparing for a secure retirement. 9 On
the other hand, the opponents of the plan within the industry fear a
misunderstanding of the policy's non-guarantee features and, in case
of a depression, a resultant loss of the great confidence the public
places in the industry's reputation for safety and certainty.40 A less
oft-mentioned objection is the possibility that the federal government
may impose comprehensive federal regulations upon all or part of
.he insurance industry. 41 If the SEC is successful in the current
litigation, or special variable annuity legislation is passed on a federal
level, all firms choosing to issue the variable annuity will, to some
extent, be subject to federal regulation. Such regulation would be
voluntary since only those firms choosing to issue the contracts would
ance companies. Section 90 of the N.Y. Insurance Law permits the insurance
commissioner to deny a foreign corporation the right to conduct business in
New York if their investments do not substantially meet the investment standards imposed upon domestic insurers. Because of the large amount of insurance written in New York, it appears doubtful that any company would issue
variable annuities if their right to do business in New York would be jeopardized thereby.
36 Hereinafter referred to as CREF.
37 Laws of N.Y. 1952, c. 124.
38 Hereinafter referred to as TIAA.
39 Shanks, Do Variable Annuities Meet the Need?, Dun's Review & Modern Industry, Sept. 1956, p. 43.
40 Ecker, The Case Against Variable Anndties, Dun's Review & Modem
Industry, Oct. 1956, p. 41.
41 Id. at 132.
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be required to submit to it, but many feel that it would
be a prelude
42
to general federal regulation of the insurance industry.
Tax Aspects
The treasury department has ruled that variable annuities are
to be treated, for tax purposes, in much the same manner as the con-

ventional annuity. 43 As a result the annuitant is not permitted a
deduction for premiums paid and he need not recognize any undistributed income. When the time for the payout to the annuitant
arrives, an annual exclusion ratio is computed by dividing the annuitant's total investment in the contract by his life expectancy as determined by the appropriate tables in the regulations. 44 To the extent
that the payments in any one year exceed the annual exclusion factor,
4
such payments will be included in the gross income of the recipient. 5
If in any one year the total amount received is less than the annual
exclusion factor, the annuitant may elect, in any succeeding taxable
year in which a payment is received, to recompute the exclusion factor.
Such recomputation consists of dividing the deficiency by the remaining life expectancy of the beneficiary and adding the result to the
prior annual exclusion factor. 46 All amounts not treated as annuity
payments are considered as ordinary income. 47 The insurance company is not considered as a mere conduit, and therefore dividend credit,
exclusion of government interest payments, and capital gains treatment are not available; 48 but the income recognized is eligible for the
retirement income credit. 49 If the annuitant surrenders his contract
before maturity, any amount received in excess of his investment in
the contract is treated as ordinary income.50 The tax attributable to
the inclusion of such income in gross income for the taxable year
shall not be greater than the aggregate of the tax that would have
been attributable to such income had it been ratably included in the
income of the annuitant in the current and the two immediately preceding taxable years. 51 No loss can be recognized unless the taxpayer
establishes that he bad purchased the annuity contract for profit in
the first instance.5 2 If the annuitant transfers his interest in the contract to a third party for value, he will be allowed capital gain
42 See Chellberg, Regulation of Isurance-The State-Federal Controversy,
L. REV. 25 (1957).
7 DEPAUL
43
Treas. Reg. § 1.172-2(b) (3) (1956).
44 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.172-6, -9 (1956).
45 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(c).

46
4 7 Treas. Reg.

§

1.172-4(d) (3)

(1956).

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(c) (1).
48
See, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(a).
40
INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §37(c) (1).
50 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(e) (2) (b).
51
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(e) (3).
52 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c) (2).
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treatment. 53 In addition to the tax imposed upon the annuitant, the
insurance company also is4 taxed at an effective rate of 7.8 per cent
on its investment income.
Many leaders in the securities industry have attacked the tax
treatment afforded to the variable annuity on the ground that this
treatment discriminates against both the investor in a mutual fund
and the individual private investor.55 Therefore, a comparison of
the treatment afforded each of these media would appear appropriate.
This comparison should not be made in terms of figures alone. It
must be remembered that there is a basic difference between the three
plans. The variable annuity contract is basically a vehicle designed
for long-term retirement planning. Personal investments and investments in mutual funds provide a readily marketable investment. Since
Congress has repeatedly manifested its realization of the social and
economic needs of our retired citizens and has as a result granted
them certain tax concessions,5 6 it should not come as a surprise to
find some slight benefits afforded to the variable annuitant.
The mutual fund investor is taxed at ordinary income rates in
the taxable year of receipt on all dividend income,57 subject to the
50-dollar dividend exclusion 58 and the four per cent dividend credit. 9
He is also taxed, but at capital gain rates, on all capital gain dividends. 60 If the mutual fund member is using his investment as a
retirement program, the sale of a number of shares each year would
parallel the variable annuitant's annual payments. Such sales are
taxed at capital gain rates. 61 Upon a redemption of the shares by the
fund, which is equivalent to a surrender by a variable annuitant, the
fund member will receive capital gain or loss treatment. 62 The mutual fund itself is taxable only on undistributed investment or capital
income and as a result pays little or no tax.6
53
54

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§§ 1201(b), 1221.
§ 811. See Schechter, Variable Aniuities-Boon

or Bane?, 1956 INs. L.J. 764, 772.
55 See, e.g., Funston, The Case Against Variable Annuities, Dun's Review &
Modern Industry, Oct. 1956, pp. 41, 135.
56 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 37, 151(c), 213(a) (2).
Persons sixty-five
and over are permitted a double personal exemption [§ 151 (c)], a retirement
income credit [§ 37], and are not subject to the limitation on medical expenses
[ 213 (a) (2)]. The social security system is the greatest recognition of the

problem.
57

INV. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 6 1(a) (7).

REV. CODE OF 1954, § 116(a). Section 116(c) (2) subjects the exclusion to the limitations imposed in § 854 when the distribution by the company
does not substantially represent dividend income.
59 IN.
RE-. CODE OF 1954, § 34(a). Section 34(d) (2) subjects the dividend
credit to the limitations of § 854.
60
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 852(b) (3).
61 NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201(b), 1221.
62 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §8302(b), 1201(b), 1221.
63 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 852.
58 INT.
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The individual investor would receive much the same tax treatment as the mutual fund member. He would be currently taxed on
all distributed or distributable dividends and entitled to the dividend
credit and exclusion. 64 He would receive capital gain treatment in
the taxable year of transfer on all sales or exchanges of such
investments. 65
Thus, the only apparent advantage that is afforded to the variable
annuitant is the non-recognition of his pro rata share of the insurer's
current income. This gives the variable annuitant an advantage, since
his taxable income during the payout period, when the gains realized
over the years will be ultimately recognized, will conceivably be much
less than during his working years. Therefore, as a result of the
graduated tax rates, he should obtain the benefit of a low effective
rate. However, this advantage may be offset by several factors.
While the mutual fund member and individual investor may be taxed
at a higher rate on currently distributed dividend income during their
earning years, the tax rate on long-term capital gains never exceeds
twenty-five per cent. If the mutual fund member intends to use his
investments for retirement planning, he can achieve a low effective
rate on any appreciation in value by annually cashing in or selling
only the number of shares required to satisfy his current needs. In
this way he may take advantage of the twenty-five per cent capital
gain rate or his current ordinary income rate on any appreciations
in value not previously recognized. In addition, if he has suffered a
loss he will be permitted to offset it against any other capital income
that he might have in these years.
Thus it would appear that, although the variable annuitant may
fare somewhat better taxwise during the years in which he need not
recognize any income, there appears that there may be little or no
over-all advantage over individual investors or mutual fund members.
Conclusion
The variable annuity has been proposed as an answer to the
retired individual's problem of consistently maintaining a desired
standard of living after retirement. While it is almost certain that
an adequate investment in variable annuities alone could achieve this
result during an inflationary period, it seems that it will be necessary
for the annuitant to balance his investment in variable annuities with
a reasonably proportionate investment in stable or guaranteed investments in order to achieve protection throughout the entire economic
cycle.
Currently, attempts are being made to bring the variable annuity
under the Securities Act of 1933, and the issuing companies under
6

4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
REv. CODE OF 1954,

65

INT.

§§34(a), 61(a), 116(a).
§§1201(b), 1221.
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the Investment Company Act of 1940. The variable annuity was not
in existence or even contemplated at the time that these statutes were
enacted. Therefore, since the contract does not come within the exact
definitions of the Securities Act, new legislation specifically adopted
to the unique problems involved appears to be the proper solution,
either on the state or federal level. It would seem beneficial if currently operative insurance companies are permitted to issue the variable annuity instead of requiring the formation of new and independent corporate entities. Finally, continuation of the present, somewhat
favorable, tax treatment of the variable annuity seems proper and
consistent with the legislature's sympathetic attitude towards the
problems of our retired population.

